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Longshoremen's Embargo of Soviet Goods:
A Secondary Boycott or a Political Protest?
In January of 1980 the International Longshoremen's Associaton,
(ILA), boycotted any and all material destined for or originated from the
Soviet Union. The boycott was announced as a political protest of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, the boycott spawned
several lawsuits contesting the legality of the union action: New Orleans
Steamship Ass'n v. Longshore Workers;' Baldovin v. ILA" and Walsh v.
ILA.' This comment will focus on these three decisions and their treatment of three major issues: first, whether the boycott is within the commerce jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); sec-

ond, whether the boycott is within the labor dispute jurisdiction of the
NLRB; and third, whether the boycott constituted a secondary boycott in
violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act
4

(NLRA).

I.

A.

COMMERCE JURISDICTION

General Background

The NLRB was created by Congress through the NLRA as an agency
to supervise labor disputes and, as an agency created by Congress, it is
well settled that NLRB jurisdiction is confined to labor disputes that affect commerce.' Section 2(6) of the Act' defines commerce in respect to
1. 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980).
2. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
3. 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1980). Walsh was appealed to the First Circuit which
vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the dispute on the basis of res judicata,
630 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980). All references to Walsh will be to the opinion of the district
court since the res judicata ruling is not relevant to this comment.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). The present National Labor Relation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (1976), had its beginning with the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L.
No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The 1935 Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136. The Act was further amended
by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L.
No. 257, 73 Stat. 519. A final amendment was the Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 360, 88
Stat. 395. All subsequent references will be to "the Act" unless otherwise specified.
5. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976).
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the Board's jurisdiction: "commerce means trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or between
the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any
State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any state,
Territory, or the District of Columbia .

. . ."

From this definition it is

apparent that trade between any state and a foreign country is within the
term "commerce". Section 2(7) of the Act provides the meaning of "affecting commerce", defining it as "burdening or obstructing commerce or
the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor
'
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or free flow of commerce. 7
And section 10(a) of the Act provides for Board jurisdiction "to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting commerce."' Originally, NLRB jurisdiction was predicated upon a showing
that a labor dispute affected a substantial volume of commerce. However, several Supreme Court opinions have expanded the jurisdiction of
the Board10 so that today, the Board is empowered to exercise jurisdiction
over unfair labor practices without any requisite volume of commerce.""
Since NLRB jurisdiction is limited to disputes that affect commerce,
the threshold question in judging the legality of the ILA boycott was
whether that boycott qualified under the commerce jurisdiction of the
Board. Although the Supreme Court has not decided this precise question
it "has offered guidance in a series of cases that delineate the meaning of
the all-encompassing words 'in commerce' as applied to boycotts remediable by domestic action."'" One of the earlier Supreme Court opinions concerned a union's picketing at the secondary employer's place of business."' The Court concluded that when the union activity was arguably an
unfair labor practice, the Board had jurisdiction to enjoin the picketing of
7.

29 U.S.C. § 152(7)(1976).

8.

29 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1976).

9. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1936).
10. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); NLRB v. Fairbalt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
11. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 22(1976).
12. 626 F.2d at 450. In Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957), foreign
crew members of a foreign ship struck against the foreign shipowners. The crew named an
American union to represent them. Justice Clark, writing for the majority of the Supreme
Court, stated that the Board lacked jurisdiction because federal labor laws did not cover
foreign nationals employed by foreign entities. Id. at 147. The Benz rule was reaffirmed six
years ater in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineras de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10(1963)
and Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Worker's Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963). The underlying reason for denying Board jurisdiction was the lack of connection to any commercial
element affecting Americans. The same rationale cannot be applied to a maritime union's
refusal to handle substantial amounts of goods either entering or leaving the American
marketplace.
13. Hattiesburg Bldg. and Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964)(per curiam).

1981]

EMBARGO OF SOVIET GOODS

859

the secondary employer, regardless of whether the operations of the pri14
mary employer were within "commerce".
In 1974, the Supreme Court delivered two opinions in which the facts
were similar to the ILA boycott situation: Windward Shipping (London)
Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n"s and American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile
Steamship Ass'n." Both cases arose out of the same 1971 multiunion
picketing that protested the use of foreign owned vessels to transport
American cargo.' 7 In Windward, the ILA picketed a foreign ship to protest the low wages paid to the non-American, nonunion crew.' 8 The Supreme Court found that the dispute was beyond the scope of the Board's
jurisdiction since the union sought to force a foreign entity to raise its
wages, and thus interfere with the maritime operations of foreign
vessels. 19
The situation was slightly different in Mobile because it was the stevedore company, rather than the foreign shipowner, that sought to enjoin
the union protest. This distinction, however, was not decisive in the majority opinion.20 The Court concluded that the dispute was, again, between the union and the foreign shipowner and was, therefore, beyond

the statutory authority of the Board." However, the Supreme Court in
Mobile expressly approved of prior lower court decisions that had recognized Board jurisdiction over secondary activities in violation of section
8(b)(4) of the Act when the secondary activities were targeted at domestic
conditions, regardless of whether the primary employer was a foreign
entity.2
14. Id. at 126-27. See also Pennello v. ILA, 227 F. Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1964); International Longshoremen's Union, 161 N.L.R.B. 451, 63 L.R.R.M. 1284 (1966).
15. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
16. 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
17. Windward, 415 U.S. at 106; Mobile, 419 U.S. at 217.
18. 415 U.S. at 107.
19. Id. at 115. The Court relied on its prior holdings in Incres S.S. Co. v. International
Maritime Worker's Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963) and Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353
U.S. 138 (1957).
20. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Blackmun and Powell. 419 U.S. at 217.
21. Id. at 234. The dissent, Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, presented
a persuasive argument to the contrary, pointing out that an American stevedore company
alleging secondary pressure from an American labor union, arising from the union's dispute
with another entity, was within the commerce and unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the
Board. Id. at 234 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion pointed out that the characterization of a dispute often determines whether it fits under the definition of commerce
jurisdiction. The dissenters argued that the union picketing was a wrongful interference
with an American stevedore company's lawful right to conduct business and was, therefore,
in violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. Id. at 235-36.
22. Id. at 225 n.10. See ILA Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970);
Grain Elevator v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967); Mad-
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B. Bladovin: ILA Boycott Is Not Within Commerce Jurisdiction
Baldovin v. ILA23 was a Fifth Circuit decision that consolidated two
similar factual situations.2 " The union's refusal to handle cargo connected
in some manner to the Soviet Union was common to both situations. The
court in Baldovin observed that the Board had
adopted as the touchstone for determining whether a particular activity
affects commerce the foreignness of the objective of those engaged in the
activity and the degree of intrusion into the affairs of the foreign entity
which will be brought about by that entity's response to the activity in
question.2 5
The consistent theme supporting the Windward and Mobile decisions
was that, in each situation, the union activity would force a foreign entity
to respond by either raising the wages of nonunion workers or by hiring
longshoremen at the higher union rate. The Supreme Court in Windward
and Mobile thought that the union activity would require a response from
den v. Grain Elevator Workers, 334 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967
(1965).
In Ariadne, the union picketed foreign ships in protest of low wages paid to American
longshoremen. The Supreme Court decided that Board jurisdiction was proper since there
was no interference with the internal affairs of the foreign ships. 397 U.S. at 200. See also
ILA and Warehousemen's Union, 161 N.L.R.B. 451, 63 L.R.R.M. 1284 (1966); Marine Cooks
and Stewards Union, 156 N.L.R.B. 753, 61 L.R.R.M. 1140 (1966); New York Shipping Ass'n
Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1183, 38 L.R.R.M. 1419 (1956); But see Urauic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S.
234 (1931).
Grain Elevator and Madden, collectively referred to as the Grain Elevator cases, arose
out of the attempts of an American union to force its American secondary employer to cease
doing business with its Canadian primary employer. The union tried to induce American
workers, employed by the secondary employer, to refuse to handle cargo at an American
port. The activity was found to be secondary, in violation of the Act. The Seventh Circuit
approved Board jurisdiction, stating that any other conclusion would "nullify the secondary
boycott provision of the Act." 334 F.2d at 1020 (footnote omitted).
23. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
24. The first situation arose in Houston, Texas when the ILA refused to load American
corn onto a vessel destined for the Soviet Union. Id. at 448. The Texas Farm Bureau, Kansas Farm Bureau and the American Farm Bureau all brought charges to the NLRB alleging
that the Union was engaging in an unlawful secondary boycott. The regional director of the
NLRB investigated and found reason to believe that a possible violation was occurring. A
petition was filed with the district court in southern Texas for a preliminary injunction
under § 10(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)(1976). The injunction was denied. 626 F.2d at
448. The second situation arose in Georgia when ILA locals refused to unload cargo from the
Soviet Union. The regional director petitioned for a preliminary § 10(1) injunction and the
injunction was granted. Id.
25. 626 F.2d at 452. The court quoted from the Supreme Court opinion in Incres S.S. Co.
v. International Maritime Worker's Union, 372 U.S. 24, 27 (1963): "Maritime operations of
foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen are not 'in commerce' within the meaning of [the
Act]."
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a foreign entity which would constitute interference with the maritime
operations of that foreign entity.20 Similarly, the court in Baldovin concluded that the ILA boycott would interfere excessively with the foreign
policy of the Soviet Union;" thus, the court reasoned that the boycott

was beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Essentially, the court in Baldovin characterized the ILA's boycott objective as merely a political protest against the Soviet Union.2 s When
compared to the union activities in Windward and Mobile, the boycott
was even "further removed from the type of domestic labor relations that
the Act was intended to cover. . . . When the dispute is over a foreign
government's invasion of a remote nation, it is more emphatically not 'in
commerce.' "" Relying on language in Mobile, the court in Baldovin re-

marked that, "[w]hile the ILA refusal to work has affected American
farmers who produce the grain, American transportation companies who

move it to ports and the American stevedores who load it aboard vessels,
it is patent that this was an incidental effect and not the objective."80
Therefore, according to the court in Baldovin, the dispute was not within
"commerce", as defined by the Act, and the injunction was denied.31
C.

Analysis of Baldovin

Both the express language of the Act and the case law support a conclusion opposite to the decision in Baldovin.32 "Commerce," as defined by
section (2)(6) of the Act, includes trade between any state in this country

and a foreign country." Thus, trade and transportation of cargo to or
from the Soviet Union should be considered within commerce.
Additionally, the court in Baldovin should have found that the boycott
26. Windward, 415 U.S. at 115; Mobile, 419 U.S. at 219.
27. 626 F.2d at 453.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 452. See Mobile, 419 U.S. at 226.
31. 626 F.2d at 454. In direct contrast to the decision reached in Baldovin, the court in
Walsh v. ILA concluded that the union activity clearly "affected commerce" within the
meaning of the Act since the "controversy concerns the actual passage of goods from the
U.S.S.R. to a consignee in the United States." 488 F. Supp. at 528.
The decision in New Orleans, a companion case to Baldovin, did not expressly address
the commerce jurisdiction issue, but deferred to the opinion in Baldovin. 626 F.2d at 465
n.9.
32. See notes 6 and 7 supra, and accompanying text. See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34 (1937), in which the Court concluded that the criterion is the
effect on commerce; if there is a substantial relationship to interstate commerce, appropriate for regulation, then Congress and its delegated agent, the NLRB, cannot be denied jurisdiction. Id. at 5.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 152(6)(1976).
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affected commerce. The basic premise is that courts should focus on the
domestic effects of a union's activity. If the activity affects domestic commerce, without regard to the amount of commerce affected, then the
Board should have commerce jurisdiction.
The observation that the boycott would have only an incidental effect
on American farmers, shippers, stevedores and others was perhaps an attempt by the court to ignore the domestic impact of the union activity. A
constructive analysis of this portion of the court's opinion is difficult since
the court gave no indication of the scale on which it measured the consequences inflicted on the American farmers, employers and other parties.
However, whether the domestic consequences were incidental or not, the
boycott undeniably affected commerce within the meaning of the Act
since no relative volume of commerce need be affected under section 2(7)
of the Act.3 The boycott obstructed the free flow of commerce, and, in
the words of the Supreme Court, "it is the effect on commerce, not the
source of injury, which is the criteria. . . ,,s3
For these reasons, the court
in Baldovin was incorrect to deny commerce jurisdiction.
As the Supreme Court has made clear, the critical distinction to be
made in determining Board jurisdiction is the impact of the union's activity.36 In Mobile, the Court noted that simply directing a boycott at a foreign entity does not automatically preclude NLRB jurisdiction.3 ' Hence,
the opinion in Mobile yields a rule applicable to the ILA boycott: when
union activities impact domestic conditions, the Board has jurisdiction
whether or not the primary employer is a foreign entity.3 8 The court in

Baldovin noted, but could not distinguish, the Grain Elevator cases in
which a union sought to induce workers at an American firm to strike in
order to force the American employer to terminate its business connections with a foreign entity. s In the Grain Elevator cases, the court held
that the union activity was an unfair labor practice. " However, the importance of these cases was the courts' focus on the domestic effect of the
would-be strike. Although the union directed its activity at the foreign
34. Id. at § 152(7).
35. 301 U.S. at 32.
36. See NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 520 (1977); NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See also Polish Nat'l Alliance
v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944); Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. v. General Longshore Workers, 591 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1979).
37. 419 U.S. at 225 n.10.
38. Id.
39. 626 F.2d at 453 n.5. The court in Baldovin noted that the Grain Elevator cases are
distinguishable from the present cases: "the distinction is solely one of degree and we cannot say that a bright line can be drawn between them and the present cases." 626 F.2d at
453 n.5.
40. Id.
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entity, the courts properly focused on the domestic impact or the domestic target. Similarly, the court in Baldovin should have examined the obvious domestic effects of the ILA boycott, rather than brushing off the
41
effects as incidental.
The ILA boycott was characterized by the Union as targeted against
the Soviet Union; however, the effect was the hinderance of the free flow
of commerce between the two nations. This point is best seen in an
"ends-means" analysis: the "end" of the boycott, the announced objective, was to make a political statement against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the "means," the method of effectuating the objective, was the
actual boycott. The predictable consequence of the ILA boycott was the
disruption of trade and commerce between the American employers and a
foreign entity. Had the court in Baldovin focused on the means employed
by the union to make its statement, and the predictable consequences of
those means, it could have found that the boycott was well within the
commerce jurisdiction of the NLRB.
II.
A.

LABOR DISPUTE JURISDICTION

General Background

As a general rule, the exercise of Board jurisdiction requires that the
controversy both affect commerce and be a labor dispute.4 2 Nevertheless,
inquiry into these areas is separate and distinct."3 Section 2(9) of the Act
defines labor dispute as: "any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons
in negotiating,. . . maintaining, changing. . . terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proxi44
mate relations of employer and employee.
The disputes arising out of the ILA boycott were not typical labor disputes. The union was not protesting against any employer,46 but rather,
sought to make a political statement. When union activities, strikes or
boycotts have had political motivations, courts have had difficulty determining if the dispute was within the Board's labor dispute jurisdiction.
Some courts, particularly the Fourth Circuit, concluded that a political
strike or boycott was not a labor dispute and, therefore, not subject to
41. 626 F.2d at 452.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6),(7)(1976).
(1963).
43. 626 F.2d at 465 n.9. See also
44. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976).
45. "The ILA concedes that it has
... and that its sole dispute is with

NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226
Windward, 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
no dispute with any person doing business at the Port
the U.S.S.R." Baldovin, 626 F.2d at 448.
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Board jurisdiction."' Other courts tended to construe narrowly the Fourth
Circuit's absolute approach to the labor dispute issue,4 ' and both the
Board and the D.C. Circuit have disregarded it altogether.'" However, it
is not necessary to resolve whether a political dispute constitutes a labor
dispute. The ILA boycott is allegedly an unfair labor practice; and a labor
dispute "in the strict sense" is not necessary for NLRB jurisdiction over
an alleged unfair labor practice.4"
Two decisions illustrate this general rule: United States Steel Corp. v.
United Mine Workers"0 and Penello v. ILA. 5' In Penello, the ILA responded to the Cuban missile crisis by boycotting all ships arriving from
Cuba and those ships known to have traded with Cuba. The court concluded that the boycott violated the secondary boycott provisions of the
Act, and, most importantly, concluded that unlawful boycott actions
often are purely political and, therefore, not ordinary labor disputes, but
they are nevertheless within the Board's jurisdiction.5 A similar result
was reached in United States Steel, which concerned a union strike to
protest the importation of South African coal. Although the strike was
not aimed at the employers in the traditional labor dispute sense, the
court looked to the impact of the strike and concluded that Board jurisdiction was proper.5 3 Hence, when the controversy centers around an alleged unfair labor practice, the only serious constraint on Board jurisdiction is the commerce provision."

46. NLRB v. ILA, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964). Although West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v.
ILA, 413 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1975), affd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976),
stated that a strike called for political reasons was not a labor dispute, the precedential
value of this opinion is questionable since the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans impliedly overruled this portion of West Gulf, noting that West Gulf was only a summary affirmance. 626
F.2d at 464-65.
47. NLRB v. Twin City Carpenters, 422 F.2d 309, 312-13 (8th Cir. 1970); National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965).
48. National Maritime Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1317-18 n.3, 56 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1964),
enforced, 346 F.2d 411, 414-16 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
49. Harrington & Co. v. ILA Local 1416, 356 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See
also Khedivial Line, SAE v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
50. 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976). (The Supreme Court
in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) cited the U.S. Steel decision as "in accord" with the Second Circuit decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Buffalo Forge. 428 U.S. at 404 n.9).
51. 227 F. Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1964).
52. Id. at 170.
53. 519 F.2d at 1247.
54. The Board shall have jurisdiction to "prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
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New Orleans: ILA Boycott Is Within Labor Dispute Jurisdiction

The decision in New Orleans" was another Fifth Circuit opinion that
consolidated two similar factual controversies." Each controversy arose
out of the ILA's refusal to load cargo destined for the Soviet Union. The
Stevedores sought an injunction and enforcement of the arbitration
clauses, and, in response, the Union asserted that there was no labor dispute jurisdiction because the boycott was only a political protest. 7 Prior
Fifth Circuit opinions had reached inconsistent conclusions on the issue
of whether a political boycott was a labor dispute. In West Gulf Maritime
Ass'n v. ILA, 58 the court held that a political boycott was not a labor
dispute. However, in United States Steel, the court expressly found labor
dispute jurisdiction over a politically motivated boycott." After careful
consideration, the court in New Orleans stated:
We find it difficult satisfactorily to reconcile these decisions. To the extent that they are inconsistent, we consider the rationale of United
Adhering to the earlier
States Steel Corp. to be more persuasive ....
and more fully expressed opinion, we find that a strike called to further
the political goals of the union does "involve or grow out of any labor
dispute" for purpose of the . . . Act.8
Thus, the court in New Orleans held that an injunction could issue, and
55. 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. The first controversy arose in New Orleans, Louisiana when ILA locals refused to
load American corn on board a vessel destined for the Soviet Union. The second controversy
arose in Jacksonville, Florida when ILA locals refused to load superphosphoric acid on
board several Norwegian vessels destined for the Soviet Union. In both situations the union
had signed a collective bargaining agreement containing arbitration and no-strike clauses
with the primary employer, the stevedores. In both cases, the stevedores invoked the arbitration clauses and sought to enforce the no-strike clauses. Id. at 459. The principle issue in
New Orleans was whether an injunction could issue under state law. The court in New
Orleans held that, since the Board did not have jurisdiction, state law was not preempted
and an injunction could issue under state law.
The court in Baldovin did not address the labor dispute jurisdiction issue. The court in
Walsh apparently disregarded the matter, by stating that Board jurisdiction was proper
whenever the Board showed reasonable cause to believe jurisdiction existed in a § 10(1)
proceeding, 488 F. Supp. at 529. "This standard has been applied to determinations of jurisdiction in § 10(1) proceedings, where the exercise of jurisdiction depends upon the discretionary policy of the Board." Id. (citing Hoffman v. Retail Clerks Union, 422 F.2d 793, 795
(9th Cir. 1970) and McLeod v. Building Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 227 F. Supp. 242, 24445 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)).
57. 626 F.2d at 464.
58. 413 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Tex. 1975), affd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976).
59. 519 F.2d 1236, 1247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
60. 626 F.2d at 465. However, the court deferred to the opinion in Baldovin on commerce jurisdiction. Id. at 465 n.9.
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the arbitrator's decisions could be enforced without violating the Act. 1
C. Analysis of New Orleans
Ordinarily, the exercise of NLRB jurisdiction requires the controversy
to be a "labor dispute"." Nevertheless, the need to protect neutral parties from the economic pressures of secondary boycotts has stretched the
Board's jurisdiction into situations that are not a typical "labor dispute."
NLRB jurisdiction over secondary boycotts, in which the union, by definition, does not have a labor dispute with the employer, is a necessary and
desirable consequence of Board jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, as
provided by the Act.as Therefore, the court in New Orleans was correct in
its observation that, for the purposes of the Act, a political boycott satisfies the labor dispute jurisdiction requirements. A holding to the contrary
would prevent regulation of unfair labor practices hidden beneath a politicl protest. Unions or employers could escape NLRB scrutiny by combining their unlawful strikes with political protests; that result would effectively negate NLRB implementation of the Act and the intent of
Congress.
III.

A.

SEcONDARY BoYcoTT

General Background

Section 8(b)(4) of the Act states that it is an "unfair labor practice" for
a union to engage in or to encourage other employees to strike, or to refuse to handle materials, or to threaten or coerce any person, when the
object of that activity is to force or restrain any person from conducting
business with any other person." Seizing upon the actual language of the
61. 626 F.2d at 463.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
64. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976) provides in
relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
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Act and the intent of Congress, the Supreme Court formulated a twopronged test to determine if any particular union activity constitutes a
secondary boycott:6 5 First, was there a strike, or strike-like activity; or, in
the alternative, was there a threatening or coercive action made by the
union to any other person? And, second, was the objective of either the
strike-like action or the threatening activity designed to force one party
to cease doing business with another party?" In short, the test reflects
the legislative intent to protect neutral employers or other persons from
economic pressures inflicted by a union when the union's dispute is really
7
with another party.
Something less than a full strike is enough to satisfy the first prong.
For example, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 65 the Supreme Court held that a work refusal was a strike-like activity within the
meaning of the first prong of the test. In that case, union workers refused
to handle non-union construction material at the secondary employer's
place of business.6 The Supreme Court concluded that, notwithstanding
a contract provision requiring the use of union-made material,
the refusal
70
to work violated the prohibition on secondary boycotts.
Similarly, determining whether the second prong is satisfied is often
difficult. Recently, the Fifth Circuit, in Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. v.
General Longshore Workers7 1 restated the distinction between primary
and secondary objectives as originally formulated by the Supreme Court
in National Woodwork: "[Wihether the union's objective was primary or
secondary turns on whether their activities were 'addressed to the labor
relations of the contracting employer vis-A-vis his own employees,' and
therefore primary, or 'tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elseother producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ....
65. National Woodword Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 624 (1967); United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1958).
66. 386 U.S. at 624. See also Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. v. General Longshore Workers,
591 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1979).
67. Hoffman v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 617 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); National
Woodworker Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
68. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
69. Id. at 95.
70. Id. at 110. The Court concluded that the work refusal was intended to force the
contractor to cease doing business with the subcontractor, who was the supplier of the nonunion material. Id.
71. 591 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1979). The employer owned and operated grain loading facilities and normally employed only union workers. However, the 1975 Soviet wheat deal
brought in thousands of tons more grain than usual. In response to the deluge of grain, the
employer hired nonunion workers. Id. at 286.
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where,' and thus unlawful secondary conduct."' 72 In other words, a union
may lawfully object and strike or refuse to work if its dispute is directed
at its employer, based on the labor relations between the union and that
employer. However, it is unlawful secondary activity if the union strikes
against its employer or a secondary employer when there is no conflict or
dispute between the union and that employer. Thus, if the union strikes
or refused to work in order to achieve some desired objective that has no
bearing on the employer or the labor relations between the two, then the
activity is unlawful under the Act.
A related problem occurs when a union has both primary (lawful)
objectives behind its strike or work refusal, as well as secondary (unlawful) objectives. The Supreme Court has ruled that the second prong of
the secondary boycott test is satisfied once any secondary objective is
found.73 In other words, secondary objectives need not be the union's sole
purpose.74 Hence, if there are several objectives behind a union strike or
boycott, and one of those objectives is an unlawful secondary objective,
then the union activity will be deemed an unfair labor practice and
within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
B. Walsh: ILA Boycott Is Not a Secondary Boycott
The dispute in Walsh v.ILA7 5 arose in Boston Harbor when the ILA,
pursuant to the union boycott, refused to work on three American vessels
loaded with Soviet cargo.76 The importer-exporter corporation petitioned
the Board alleging that the union's boycott constituted a secondary boycott with the objective of forcing the importer to cease doing business
with the steamship company, the stevedores, and the Soviet Union. 7 The
regional director of the Board agreed and petitioned the district court for
a preliminary section 10(1) injunction.78 The court in Walsh reviewed the
72. 591 F.2d at 290 (quoting National Woodwork Mfrs., 386 U.S. at 644-45).
73. NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 530 (1977).
74. See, NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). "It is not
necessary to find that the sole objective of the strike was that of forcing the contractors to
terminate the subcontractor's contract." Id. at 689 (emphasis in original).
75. 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1980).
76. Id. at 526. Three different employers were adversely affected by the ILA boycott:
Allied Int'l, Inc., an importer-exporter; Waterman Steamshiplines, a transporter of cargo
and owner of many vessels; and Clark, Inc., a stevedoring corporation. Allied and Waterman
had contracted with a Soviet agency, by direct negotiations, prior to the embargo and the
boycott. These contracts with the Soviet Union did not pertain to material affected by President Carter's grain embargo. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. It is interesting to note the ease with which the court in Walsh dismissed the
jurisdictional obstacles found so insurmountable in Baldovin and New Orleans. "In
Baldovin, and in the present case, the controversy concerns the actual passage of goods from
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two-pronged Supreme Court test and concluded that it was applicable to
this type of boycott. 79 However, the court found that this boycott was not
a secondary boycott. The court focused on whether there had been a
strike or inducement to strike and concluded that the ILA had not induced a strike against the exporter, the shipping firm or the stevedore
corporation, nor, the court continued, had the union attempted to pressure those employers to terminate business ties among themselves. The
court emphasized that no picket lines had been formed and that no other
work of the employer had been disturbed. The boycott was characterized
as a simple refusal by union members to work on selected ships as a political protest.' 0 Upon this basis, the court reasoned that the union had not
engaged in a secondary boycott. In short, the boycott was a primary boycott against Soviet cargo with only incidental effects on the employers
who dealt in Soviet goods.' 1 The court emphasized the first amendment
rights of the union to protest: "Indeed, if the bare refusal to work in the
circumstances shown should be held illegal, the union would be deprived
of its right of expression and the proviso of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) would
be emptied of meaning."'s For these reasons, the court denied the preliminary injunction.
C.

Analysis of Walsh

The opinion in Walsh focused on the absence of a strike or a picket
line. Unfortunately, that focus was incorrect and completely ignored the
the U.S.S.R. to a consignee in the United States. In [the court's view], this is clearly commerce, and clearly distinguishable from the cited Supreme Court cases." Id. at 528.
79. Id. at 530.
80. Id. at 530-31.
81. Id. at 531. The court noted that a secondary boycott could not result from a union's
inducement of American firms to cease doing business with the Soviet Union because the
Soviet Union could not be classified as "any other person" under the Act. Id. at 531 n.5.
However, that may misstate the law. "Person" is defined in the Act as: "one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives,
trustees, trustees in bankruptcy or receivers." 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976). The Supreme Court
has previously found that a county is a person within the meaning of the Act and entitled to
NLRB protection from unfair labor practices. Plumbers Local 298 v. County of Door, 359
U.S. 354 (1959). The opinion in Walsh disclosed that the petitioners contracted with an
agency of the Soviet Union, i.e., a legal representative of the Soviet Union. The opinion did
not disclose whether an agency of the Soviet Union was analogous to a corporation created
by the United States government. In any event, the court in Walsh should not have foreclosed this conclusion without properly exploring the definition of "person."
82. 488 F. Supp. at 531 (quoting NLRB v. ILA, 332 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that the ILA's boycott of vessels which had traded with Cuba during the missile crisis
was not a secondary boycott)). In contrast to Walsh, the court in New Orleans held that a
refusal to work "occasioned only by words is not to be distinguished from one occasioned by
a picket line." 626 F.2d at 463.
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language of the Act. Section 8(b)(4) clearly states that an unfair labor
practice may take the form of either a strike or a "refusal in the course of
. . . employment to use, manufacture, possess, transport, or otherwise
Thus, it was irhandle or work on any goods, articles, materials. . .. ,,83
relevant whether the union had struck or picketed the employers or the
vessels because the ILA had, in fact, engaged in a work stoppage within
the meaning of the Act, albeit selective in scope. The court in Walsh did
not address this fact; if it had, it would probably have concluded that the
union activity satisfied the first prong of the secondary boycott test.
In its discussion of the second prong of the test, the court in Walsh
characterized the objective of the union as a political protest of a selective
nature with only incidental effects on the American employers. 84 A recent
Supreme Court decision, however, has distinguished between primary
objectives, those dealing with the employer,8 5 and secondary (unlawful)
objectives, those dealing in other areas or with parties other than employers.86 The objective of the union boycott in Walsh did not concern a dispute with any of the employers,8 7 although it surely had a significant impact on them. Because the objectives of the union were not calculated to
further any labor dispute between it and the employers, the union alleged
a lack of labor dispute jurisdiction. However, the objectives were calculated to satisfy union goals elsewhere;a such objectives are secondary, unlawful, and within the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction.
The actual and very real domestic effect of this political boycott cannot
be overlooked. A boycott by a maritime union at American ports disrupts
the economic flow of goods from producers to consumers. The predictable
consequence of a boycott of this nature is the disruption of commerce,
and this must have been the intention of the union. In the final analysis,
the ILA engaged in a work stoppage with the intended objective of disrupting commerce and with the effect of placing unfair economic pressures on various employers and other neutral parties which were totally
unrelated to any legitimate labor dispute.

83. Section 8(b)(4) is quoted in note 64, supra. Additionally, an unfair labor practice
includes either a strike or a refusal to work. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
84. 488 F. Supp. at 531.
85. NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 511 (1977); National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 645 (1967).
86. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 511; National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644.
87. Baldovin, 626 F.2d at 448.
88. It is doubtful the ILA seriously believed that its boycott would force the Soviet
Union to withdraw its army from Afghanistan. It is more realistic to believe that the union
intended to disrupt and possibly cut off maritime trade, within its means, between the two
nations in an attempt to inflict hardship on the Soviet leadership or even to bolster the
union's public image. Neither objective has any relation to the employers; and consequently,
the indirect pressure placed on the employers was secondary, in violation of the Act.
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The purpose and intent of the secondary boycott provisions of the Act
were to protect neutral parties from secondary economic pressures exerted by unions. The decision in Walsh is contrary to this legislative purpose and intent. The conclusion reached in Walsh permitted the ILA to
interfere with the conduct of trade between the employers and the Soviet
Union, as well as among the employers themselves.
The court in Walsh apparently misplaced emphasis on the political free
speech aspect of its opinion. Freedom of speech applies to unions as well
as individuals. 9 The ILA boycott, however, was more than simple speech,
it was a political protest accompanied by a work stoppage. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly addressed the comparison between section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and first amendment freedoms."0 It has repeatedly stated
that the unfair labor practice provision imposes no unconstitutional restrictions upon speech protected by the first amendment." Consequently,
the court in Walsh should have decided the secondary boycott issue separately from its concerns for the union's right to make political statements.
The proper analysis ultilizes the secondary boycott test first, without regard to free speech. Once an unfair labor practice has been found to exist,
an injunction may issue without conflicting with the first amendment. Indeed, the court in New Orleans stated that an injunction would not pre92
vent the ILA from speaking, but only from engaging in a work stoppage.
Although the opinion in Walsh correctly identified the applicable test, it
appears that the court misapplied both prongs of that test.92
IV.

CONCLUSION

The boycott of Soviet cargo by the ILA violated the secondary boycott
provisions of the Act and was, therefore, enjoinable as an unfair labor
practice under the Board's jurisdiction. First, sections 2(6) and 2(7) indicate that trade between two nations is "commerce", and the obstruction
of the free flow of that commerce "affects commerce" within the meaning
of the Board's commerce jurisdiction. The boycott was targeted against
the sale of domestic goods to the Soviet Union by American companies,
89. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union (Safeco), 100 S. Ct. 3273 (1980);
Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974); International Bhd. of
Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 695 (1951).
90. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 229-31 (1974);
Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 56, 78 (1964); Internatonal Bhd.
sters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
91. Safeco, 100 S. Ct. at 2378.

92.

American
Electrical
NLRB v.
of Team-

626 F.2d at 463.

93. The court in Baldovin concluded that the boycott was secondary within the meaning
of the Act, but dismissed the suit on "jurisdictional" grounds. 626 F.2d at 449. The court in

New Orleans did not reach the secondary boycott issue.
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as well as the purchase of Soviet goods by American companies. Contrary
to the Baldovin opinion, the domestic secondary effect is within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Second, although NLRB jurisdiction ordinarily requires the controversy both to affect commerce and constitute a labor dispute, the Act has
provided for Board jurisdiction in secondary boycott situations even if
the dispute is not typically a labor dispute." In this way, the Act recognizes that, although secondary activities, by their very nature, may not
encompass the typical labor dispute situation, Board jurisdiction must be
available to protect neutral parties from secondary economic pressures.
Consequently, as the court in New Orleans recognized, the ILA boycott
need not fit neatly within the labor dispute language of the Act in order
for the Board to exercise jurisdiction. 5
Finally, a strike or a refusal to work, accompanied by the intent to
force or pressure neutral parties to terminate business relations with another party satisfies the secondary boycott test. The ILA boycott was a
refusal to handle Soviet cargo and, thus, a refusal to work. Additionally,
the employers were pressured either to terminate their business relations
with the Soviet agency or find willing nonunion workers with the necessary skill to perform the job safely and efficiently. The objective of the
boycott was secondary since it was intended to disrupt trade between the
employers and the Soviet Union. Although the dispute was with the Soviet Union, the American employers had to cease doing business with the
Soviet agency and among themselves, at least in relation to Soviet goods.
The boycott was not designed to affect foreign nationals, nor to interfere
with the foreign policy of another country. The boycott would have no
measurable effect on Soviet policy in Afghanistan. Instead, the boycott
was conceived for its predictable consequences, to disrupt maritime commerce between the two nations. The effect was on secondary groups in
America. In simple terms, the boycott was a work stoppage with coercive
effects on neutral employers and other parties and should have been
enjoined.
JEFFREY L. CADDELL

94. An argument can be made that the boycott does in fact meet the labor dispute requirement of the Act. The definition of labor dispute includes a dispute over the terms and
conditions of working. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9). During the boycott, the union informed the employers that union workers would not work on Soviet ships or handle Soviet cargo, essentially a term or condition of employment. Therefore, the boycott may well be seen as a
"labor dispute".
95. This comment does not address the restrictions on state jurisdiction over labor controversies, nor the federal preemption doctrine. A brief discussion of these issues in relation
to the grant of an injunction can be found in New Orleans, 626 F.2d at 462-63.

